The Future for Vietnam
SPEECH OF PROFESSOR VŨ QUÝ KỲ
at Forum:
Sunday July 14, 2019
Shadle Public Library Conference Room
Spokane, Washington
(video will be available soon)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I want to thank the organizing committee for this opportunity to contribute to discussions regarding the future for Vietnam. As a student of the Vietnam War and the consequence of the loss of South Vietnam to communism, I could briefly frame the picture in a general way, given the time available for my presentation. Three prominent questions:
Question 1:
Why Vietnam will have no future under the current communist regime?
Despite the Vietnamese communists’ ability to wage war, many studies of the Vietnam War revealed that:
First, they are not made to build peace, but to create conflict and disunity, to their benefit as rulers.
Second, and above all, they are merely a well-organized gang of bandits, highly skilled in oppressing and exploiting Vietnamese people. They did these in the name of: freedom, equality, happiness, compassion, social justice, patriotism, people welfare, socialism, independence.
Third, their highest aim and skill was to grab power, to maintain control of that power, and protect it at all cost. For the protection of their power, Hanoi volunteered to submit to China and make Vietnam an autonomous province of China, similar to Mongolia, Turkestan, and Tibet.
To justify their act of treason, Vietnamese communist leadership promoted a slogan that said: the survival of the Party will guarantee the survival of each party member (Còn Đảng Còn Mình). This led the communist leadership to brutally suppress those Vietnamese patriots who had the guts to protest against Red Chinese violation of Vietnamese territory on land and at sea.
Hanoi’s open-border policy allows Chinese crossing the Northern border freely without passport or visa. This open border is an effective measure leading to active migration of Chinese to Vietnam, accompanied by free import of Chinese goods without taxes.
Two direct consequences: first, this is a dangerous policy of converting Vietnam into a sanctuary of Chinese migrants who would over-populate Vietnam in the near future; second, Chinese are allowed to populate strategic locations in Vietnam that would threaten national security of Vietnam.
Question 2:
Why the present Communist Regime will not last?
The prolonged domination by Communism of Vietnam left behind three consequences:
First, the communist party members become a minority group of totalitarian ruling class, controlling all national resources, making themselves exceedingly rich.
Second, the majority of the population are exceedingly poor, being robbed to their bare bone. They lost all their basic right of ownership, right of free speech, and right of association.
Third, a band of opportunistic agents serve the communist tyrany by enforcing the suppressive policy. These are the plain-cloth thugs, members of the secret police force who would beat down all civil protests which only ask for social and civil justice. Consequently, the majority of the destitute and miserable citizens will be the source of potential uprising for the eventual destruction of the current order. Therefore, the current communist party will not last. The issue is When, not if.
Question 3:
Will the next “post-communist” regime have a chance to give A Future to Vietnam.
The chance is quite promising considering the following three telling points:
First, the Vietnamese people have learned the lesson of communist disaster and they no longer want to go back to the nightmare of socialism. They want to have free choice in building a political system that would respond to national need and the people’s wish.
Second, The Vietnamese people would then enjoy support of millions of Vietnamese expatriates who could bring home their resource, personal experience, technical expertise, especially their knowledge of political democracy, to develop Vietnam as a responsible member of the world community.
Third, as a responsible member of the international community, Vietnam would generate mutual trust from international partners leading to worldwide cooperation and investment allowing responsible developments, good and fair trades. The above potential future for post-communist Vietnam is not without challenges:
FIRST – Vietnamese must prove to be trustworthy, reliable, honest, the three essential qualities totally denied by Ho Chi Minh’s legacy of tyranny and irresponsible ruling. The remedy requires conscious efforts by the whole government and responsible citizens to educate and train new generations of young Vietnamese in modern time.
SECOND – The Vietnamese must be able to overcome 1.selfish individualism, 2. jealousy, 3.partisan disunity,and 4. regional and racial discriminatory spirit, the four vices encouraged by the communist rulers who wanted to divide and weaken the people for easy control.
THIRD – The Vietnamese people must take the challenge of political responsibility, personal sacrifice, and a sense of honor in assuming the task of building a worthy society and a healthy nation. Vietnamese must not forget the greatest challenge is coming from Red China to our North and the coward Vietnamese Communists who are nurturing the dream of becoming slave to Beijing for the sake of protecting their status quo. A constant reminder is the need for coordinated efforts by all Vietnamese, overseas as well as at home, in the struggle for the fall of communism in Vietnam.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Thank you very much for your attention.
Vũ Quý Kỳ
(1) Panelist for the Forum: The Future of Vietnam, July 14, 2019, Spokane, WA
3 other distinguished Panelists:
(2) Professor Eric Cunningham from Gonzaga University
(3) Retired Professor Ray Fadeley (Gonzaga University)
(4) Journalist William Jasper, Senior Editor of The New American magazine and TheNewAmerican.com
About the author
Vũ Quý Kỳ was born in 1934 in North Vietnam. He twice escaped Communism —1954 from North Vietnam and 1975 from South Vietnam. After high school in 1956, Kỳ earned a Colombo Plan scholarship for his engineering study in Australia Graduated from Adelaide University, South Australia in 1963, Ky worked in telecommunications. After the fall of South Vietnam, Ky eventually settled in Atlanta, Georgia USA with his wife and three sons. Professor Ky Quy Vu taught Physics (vật lý học) & Math (toán) in DeVry Technical Institute/University for 35 years and retired in 2014.
His is especially interested in the nature of warfare and political systems. During 1960s and 70s, Ky studied the communist political/military tactics and strategies in North and South Vietnam and wrote several analysis/research papers for the Tập San Cao Đẳng Quốc Phòng (Saigon National Defense College periodicals). His book, “A Shooting Star” just published, reflects his own experiences and his fellow countrymen, in the Vietnamese struggles during Vietnam War. This book offers an analysis of the strategies, tactics, and goals of the Vietnamese communists and nationalists during Vietnam War.
“A SHOOTING STAR” just published (Volume 1)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part I: How South Vietnam Came About
Chapter 1–––– Historical Background: A Nation Awakening
Japan Entered Vietnam
Scouting the Countryside
Who Were the Viet Minh
Japanese Coup d’état in Indochina
Map 1
How the Japanese Got the Upper Hand
Pseudo-Independence for Viet Nam
Chapter 2–––Viet Minh Seizure of Power
Power Vacuum
Surprise Mini-Coup by the Catholics
Map 2
Who Was Ho Chi Minh
Brief Narrative: Lenin, Stalin, and Nguyen Ai Quoc
Strategic Mission in China and Vietnam
Nguyen Ai Quoc and Non – Communist Vietnamese
In China – A Brief History of Conflict
Ho’s Loyalty to International Communism
What Happened in Cochi-China
The Chinese Entry to North Vietnam – Chinese Vested Interests
Chess-board Intrigues and Ensuing Tragedies
March 6 Provisional Agreement
Ho’s Consolidation of Power – Systematic Massacre
of Nationalist Factions
Chapter 3–––––The War That Started in Fall
Strategic Defense for the Viet Minh – Military situation Tonkin
Map 3
Political Reality – Rewinding the Clock
Between the end of 1946 and 1949
A New Major Unknown – The Race Against Time
France’s Arrogance and Greed Versus Wisdom And Vision
Ho’s Secret Trip To China and Russia
The Border Military Campaign
Map 4
The Chinese Version of the Border Campaign
Giap’s Lack of Battle Vision
Weak Vietnamese Leadership
Summing up: a Decisive Change in the Equation
Viet Minh’s Fifth Columnists
De Lattre de Tassigny
Giap’s Suicidal Offensive
Map 5
Chapter 4––– China – Dien Bien Phu –
End of the First Indochina War
I. Strengthened Chinese Political Influence and Control
Thought Control
Political education
Self-criticism within the Frame Work of Political Education
Success and Failure of Brainwashing,
Indoctrination, and Self-Criticis
II. Mao’s Leadership at Work
New Military Situation (1952-1953)
The North West Campaign
Map 6
Upper Laos Campaign
III. Political Circumstance – Poor Military Judgement
Giap’s Winter – Spring Offensive 1953-1954
The Cost of Poor Judgement – French Problems in
Điện Biên Phủ
Giap’s Dilemma
Map 7
Giap’s New Tactic
Map 8
Navarre’s Defense Crumbling in Điện Biên Phủ
Map 9
IV. Geneva Agreement
The French Indochina War and the Cold War-Giap’s view
Chinese Influence on Hồ’s Team
Why and How Mao Gained the Upper Hand?
How Did this Submission to Mao Happen?
The Winner and the Loser?
Geneva Political Solution – What Happened to the
Common Vietnamese
The Other Choice
Part II. Why South Vietnam Had to Fight Back Hồ’s Invasion 89
Chapter 5 –––– The Land Reform
I. Land Reform Before Điện Biên Phủ
Agrarian Tax and the Germination of Class Warfare
“Political War” against the Reactionaries
Priming Confession in Kangaroo Courts
The War for Rent Reduction
Name of the Game
Game Plan
Rules of the Game
Deliberate Mobilization of the People
A Typical Victim
The Land Reform and the First Indochina War
II. Land Reform after Geneva
Resumption of Land Reform – The Real One
Issue Facing North Vietnam
Map 10
Mild Actions in Hanoi
Bloodletting Actions in the Countryside
Kicking up the Killing Ratio (Kích Tỷ Lệ)
The Chinese Background
The Kuomintang and Rural China
Classification of farmers
Torturing Techniques and Torturing Agents
Out of Control
Peasant’s Revolt
Khrushchev and the “De-throning” of Stalin
Rectification of Errors
Failures of Rectification Campaign – Or Just a Fake?
Some Characteristics of Hồ’s Unconventional Warfare
Playing on Human Weaknesses
Playing on Accomplices in Crime
Ignoring Legalistic Procedure and Administrative
Rules
Elimination of True Regime of Rule-of-Law
Lasting Scars
Stopgap Measures and the Powerdercake
Hundred Flowers Blooming – The Cultural Revolt
Official Termination of Land Reform
III. Collectivization of Agricultural Production
Work Exchange Cells
Low Level Cooperatives
Fundamental Principles of Low Level Cooperatives
Disillusioned and Defeated Poor Peasants
Reactions by the Peasants
How the Authority Handled the Situation
Using “đoàn viên” to work on their families
Issuing Cooperative Membership Cards
Zone Allocation
High Level Cooperatives
Shortcomings in the Cooperative Program
Substitute Food ration and Contractual Animal Husbandry
Economic Reality Versus Ideological Imperatives
Map 10a
Training of Collectivized working people in labor
Skill
Bernard Fall about Malnutrition
IV. Hồ’s Achievement Through Land Reform
Regimentation of Rural Population
Institutionalization of Power Structure in the Countryside
Consolidation of Political and Security Control
Unwanted Consequences
A Vandalized Culture
Break Down of Family Foundation
Atrocity Exceeding records in Colonial Time
Enforced Ignorance
Destruction of Individual Identity
Chapter 6 ––––North Vietnam’s Preparation for War
Concept and Strategy
Reform of Industry-Trade-Capitalist-Private Enterprise
General Reorganization of the People Army
Map 11
Table 3. Labor Camps for Troops
Self-Sufficiency amid Constant Military Drills
Worker’s Condition in Non-Farming Areas
Table 4. Salary scale at Tran Hung Dao Machinery Factory
Military Modernization – Strategic Industrial Complexes –
Defense Constructions
Weapons Equipping and War Strategy
Ideological Control of the Armed Forces
Logistics Preparation and Military Training
Table 5. Military Training Camps for Foot Soldiers
Strategic and Non – Strategic Industrial Complexes
Map 12
Table 6. Electric Power serving Industrial Complexes
Table 7. Other Electric Power stations
Map 13
Map 13 bis
Other Major Defense-Related Constructions
Map 14
Part III How South Vietnam Fought Back Against Hồ’s AggressionThe Alliance in Trial and Error
Chapter 7––––– The First Republic of Viet Nam
I. Social, Cultural, and Political Background
Cultural and Regional Players: the Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo and Bình Xuyên
Origin and Growth of Cao Đài as a Religion and
Political Power
Origin and Growth of Hòa Hảo as a Religious and
Political Power
Who Were the Bình Xuyên?
Reality of French Presence
Disunity
Party Politics
Total Chaos – Impossible Job
How and Why Ngô Đình Diệm Again?
II. The Challenging Task of Restoring Power for the Central
Government
Initial Challenge
Initial Conflicts – Different Voices on Official Radio
Waves
Background of Diem’s Problems – The Triangle of
Conflicts
The Paris Angle
The Hinh Issue
The French Issue – The Washington Conference
The Washington Angle
The Mansfield Mission
Washington – On Again, Off Again
A Changed Collins
The Saigon Angle – The Symptom and the Root Cause
The Gathering Storm – The Final Showdown
Bình Xuyên Early Military Action in Support of Political
Wrangling
III. Institutional Framework – The Republic
The Concept of Top Down Formula
IV. Strength and Weaknesses of the New Republic
The True Picture
Chapter 8––––– Nation Building Amid Threat of War
I. Broad Perspective
Initial Positive Signs
Refugee Resettlement – The Huge Payback
Table 8. Rice Production and Export
Table 9. Student Enrollment
From Ideology to Political Organization
Diem’s Power Base at the Infrastructure Level
II. Rude Realit
Military Realities – National Security and Defense
The War Scenario
Difference in How the Army Should be Organized
Political Realities – Short Term Success Versus Long
Term Problems
Major Weakness in Governance
Assets Versus Liabilities
III. Real Threats Coming
The Under-Current –
A Case Study of Potential Threat to Stability
Life-and-Death Issues and the Need to Fix the Problem
Time Sensity Opportunity
Unconventional Warfare
Communist Strategy of Terror
Table 10. Douglas Pike Compilation of Communist
Acts of Terrorism
Boycotting Forces
Concerted Uprising (Đồng Khởi)
IV. Balancing the Account
The Other Side of the Coin
The “Third Side” of the Coin
What Hanoi Had in Stock
A reluctant Writer
In Spite of Early Communist Insurgency
Chapter 9–––– The Rise of Unconventional Warfare
I. Strategic Perspective
The Grand Plan of Deception – The PRP, PRG, and
NLF – The Special War
Early Sign of Trouble in SVN – The Caravelle Event
II. Geopolitical Consideration
Laotian Territory and the War in SVN
The Troika: Royalist, Communist, and Nationalist
Map 16
The 1962 Geneva Agreement – Kennedy,
Harriman’s Achievement
Why the Agreement?
Kennedy-Harriman’s Grave Mistakes
Failure of 1962 Geneva Agreement
Hanoi’s Huge Investment in Laos
Lower Laos and Hồ’s Conduit for Invasion of SVN
Infiltration System – The “Harriman’s Highway”
Map 17
Map 17 bis
Initial Effects
Hanoi’s Concept of Three Strategic Regions
Map 18
The Delta (rural Area) and Non-Conventional
Warfare
Map 19
A critical note on the treatment of Định Tường Province
The Infrastructure and the Three Pillars System
Guerrilla, Local Force, and Main Force
The Mountainous Region and the Secret Stronghold
COSVN Base Area
New Leadership in COSVN
The Urban Area and its Startegic Value
III. Tactical Consideration
Hanoi’s Concept of “Three Prong Offensive” Mission
The Case of Nguyễn Thị Định
Civilian Proselytizing in Urban Areas
Hanoi’s Success and Failure in “Civilian
Proselytizing”
American Aid and Attaching Strings
Border Protection – Montagnards in Village Defense
Surveillance
IV. Antidote to People War
Strategic Hamlets – From Sound Concept to Defective
Implementation
Systemic Picture – Military, Social, Political, and
Economic
Military Angle
Social Angle
Political Pilar
Economic Angle
Implementation of Concept
Assessment of Success and Failure
“Clear-and-hold” formula
Map 20
The Performance of Regular Armed Forces in
Unconventional Warfare
When Given a Chance
The First Battle of Ấp Bắc (January 2, 1963)